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TELEVISION ADVERTISING: AND NOW A WORD FOR
OUR SPONSORS
And now a word for our sponsors; and for consumers who want to
keep them honest. In Committee on Children's Television, Inc. v. Gen-
eral Foods, Corp.,' the California Supreme Court held that members of
the general public, or their representative organizations, could state a
cause of action against a sponsor for injunctive relief and restitution
under unfair competition' and false advertising law.
3
The controversy centered on the allegedly misleading advertising
used in the marketing of certain sugared cereals.4 The plaintiffs' filed a
class action on behalf of "California residents who have been misled or
deceived, or are threatened with the likelihood of being deceived or mis-
led," by defendants6 in connection with the marketing of the cereals.7
The Advertisers had engaged in a "nationwide, long-term advertis-
1. 35 Cal. 3d 197, 673 P.2d 660, 197 Cal. Rptr. 783 (1983).
2. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 17200 et seq. (West Supp. 1985). Section 17200 defines
unfair competition to "mean and include unlawful, unfair or misleading advertising .... "
3. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 17500 et seq. (West Supp. 1985). Section 17500 states that:
It is unlawful for any person, firm, corporation or association, or any employee
thereof with intent directly or indirectly to dispose of real or personal property or to
perform services, professional or otherwise, or anything of any nature whatsoever or
to induce the public to enter into any obligation relating thereto, to make or dissemi-
nate or cause to be made or disseminated before the public in this state, in any news-
paper or other publication, or any advertising device, or by public outcry or
proclamation, or in any other manner or means whatever, any statement, . . . which
is untrue or misleading, and which is known, or which by the exercise or reasonable
care should be known, to be untrue or misleading ....
4. General Foods manufactures five such cereals-Alpha Bits, Honeycomb, Fruity Peb-
bles, Sugar Crisp, and Cocoa Pebbles-which contain thirty-eight to fifty percent sugar by
weight. The complaint referred to them as "candy breakfasts." Committee on Children's Tele-
vision, 35 Cal. 3d at 204-05, 673 P.2d at 664, 197 Cal. Rptr. at 787.
5. Those named included five organizations (The Committee on Children's Television,
Inc.; the California Society of Dentistry for Children; the American G.I. Forum of California;
the Mexican American Political Association; and the League of Latin American citizens), indi-
vidual adults, and individual children. Id. (Hereinafter the plaintiffs will be referred to collec-
tively as the Committee.)
6. Besides General Foods, named corporate defendants included advertising agencies
Benton and Bowles, Inc., and Ogilvy and Mather International, Inc., and retailers Safeway
Stores (which sold the products to individual plaintiffs). Id. (Hereinafter the defendants will
be referred to collectively as the Advertisers.)
7. Committee on Children's Television, 35 Cal. 3d at 204-05, 673 P.2d at 663-64, 197 Cal.
Rptr. at 786-87. The Advertisers's demurrers did not attack and thus the court did not decide
the propriety of the case as a class action. However, the consumer protection statutes involved
provide for the maintenance of such an action by a private attorney general (on behalf of the
public). Therefore the Committee did not lack standing to sue under these statutes even if the
class should fail to be certified. See CAL. BUS. AND PROF. CODE §§ 17204 and 17535.
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ing campaign designed to persuade children to influence their parents"'
to buy these products. The campaign, which sought to persuade "by
imagery and example," 9 maintained a constant theme, 10 though individ-
ual advertisements were changed often. The Committee asserted that the
Advertisers made misrepresentations11 and concealed material facts 2 in
their television commercials, a combination which allegedly rendered the
advertisements misleading and deceptive.l" The Committee divided the
complaint into seven causes of action: the first two were based on state
consumer protection statutes, 14 numbers three through six on statutory
and common law fraud, and number seven on breach of fiduciary duty.
The trial court sustained the Advertisers's demurrer to all causes of
action in the Committee's fourth amended complaint without leave to
amend. The trial judge agreed with the Advertisers's claim that the alle-
gations lacked specificity,'" and he stated that the Advertisers were not
given enough information concerning that which they must answer. The
judge concluded that the complaint did not give the court "a sufficient
factual basis for its administration of the case."' 6
The Committee appealed the decision to the supreme court. In a
unanimous opinion authored by Justice Broussard, the court reversed the
lower court's holding as to the consumer protection based causes of ac-
tion, modified the holding regarding the fraud causes of action, and af-
8. Committee on Children's Television, 35 Cal. 3d at 222, 673 P.2d at 676, 197 Cal. Rptr.
at 799.
9. Id.
10. See note 11 infra, and accompanying text.
11. Committee on Children's Television, 35 Cal. 3d at 205 n. 3, 673 P.2d at 664, 197 Cal.
Rptr. at 787. The complaint listed nineteen primarily implicit representations made in the
defendants' advertisements, including the following: that eating such products is "the 'fun'
thing to do," that the products possess or impart "magical powers," that adding small
amounts of vitamins and minerals to a product automatically makes it "nutritious," and that
"bright colors in foods . . . correlate with nutritional merit." The Committee alleged that
such representations also appear in other media, and on the cereal packages themselves.
12. The Committee claimed that the advertisements concealed facts such as that "there is
no honey in Honeycomb, no fruit in Fruity Pebbles," and that sugared cereals contribute to
tooth decay and can have more serious medical consequences. Id. at 206 n.4, 673 P.2d at 665,
197 Cal. Rptr. at 788.
13. Committee on Children's Television, 35 Cal. 3d at 207, 673 P.2d at 665, 197 Cal. Rptr.
at 788.
14. See supra notes 2 & 3.
15. Committee on Children's Television, 35 Cal. 3d at 208, 673 P.2d at 666, 197 Cal. Rptr.
at 789. The judge referred to the complaint as "just a series of very general allegations to
which there is no reference of an advertisement actually made ....
16. Id. at 208, 673 P.2d at 666, 197 Cal. Rptr. at 790. [Note: neither the trial court opinion
nor the court of appeals apparent affirmation were published.]
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firmed the holding sustaining the demurrer to the breach of fiduciary
duty cause of action.
In analyzing the cause of action under the state unfair competition
laws, the court emphasized the broad definition given "unfair competi-
tion.""7  To illustrate, the court quoted its opinion in Barquis v.
Merchants Collection Association:II "the language of section 17200 'dem-
onstrates a clear design to protect consumers as well as competitors
[from fraud and deceit], permitting. . . any member of the public to sue
on his own behalf or on behalf of the public generally.' ,,t9 And just as it
had done in Barquis, the court broadly interpreted the term "unfair com-
petition" and stated that "[t]he legislature apparently intended to permit
courts to enjoin ongoing wrongful business conduct in whatever context
such activity might occur. "20
The court then equated with the unfair competition law, the intent
and requirements of the state false advertising law.2' The latter is essen-
tially unfair competition (fraud or deceit) through the use of any adver-
tising media.22 The court explained that to state a cause of action under
either statute for injunctive relief, the only requirement was a showing
that " 'members of the public are likely to be deceived' 23 . . . Allegations
of actual deception, reasonable reliance, and damage are unnecessary." 24
17. See supra note 2. Also relevant is the language appearing in § 17203:
"Any person performing or proposing to perform an act of unfair competion within
this state may be enjoined in any court of competent jurisdiction. The court may
make such orders or judgments. . . as may be necessary to restore to any person in
interest any money or property, real or personal, which may have been acquired by
means of such unfair competition."
CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 17203 (West Supp. 1985).
18. 7 Cal. 3d at 94, 496 P.2d 817, 101 Cal. Rptr. 745 (1972). In Barquis, the supreme
court held that a collection agency's practice of abusing judicial process to impair debtors'
ability to defend lawsuits could be enjoined as an unlawful business practice under section
3369 of the Civil Code. Section 3369 was the forerunner of Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200 et. seq.
See generally, Howard, Former Civil Code, Section 3369: A Study in Judicial Interpretation, 30
HASTINGS L.J. 705 (1979).
19. Committee on Children's Television, 35 Cal. 3d at 209, 673 P.2d at 667, 197 Cal. Rptr.
at 790, quoting Barquis, 7 Cal. 3d at 110, 496 P.2d at 828, 101 Cal. Rptr. at 761.
20. Id. See People v. McKale 25 Cal. 3d 626, 602 P.2d 731, 159 Cal. Rptr. 811 (1979).
21. See supra note 2.
22. Any violation of the false advertising law necessarily violates the unfair competition
law. Committee on Children's Television, 35 Cal. 3d at 210, 673 P.2d at 668, 197 Cal. Rptr. at
791.
23. Id. at 211, 673 P.2d at 668, 197 Cal. Rptr. at 791, quoting Chern v. Bank of America
15 Cal. 3d 866, 876, 544 P.2d 1310, 1316, 127 Cal. Rptr. 110, 116 (1976). See Payne v. United
California Bank 23 Cal. App. 3d 850, 100 Cal. Rptr. 672 (1972); People ex rel Mosk v. Na-
tional Research Co., 201 Cal App. 2d 765, 20 Cal. Rptr. 516 (1962). See also Audio Fidelity,
Inc. v. High Fidelity Recordings, Inc., 283 F.2d. 551, 557 (9th Cir. 1960).
24. Committee on Children's Television, 35 Cal. 3d at 211, 673 P.2d at 668, 197 Cal. Rptr.
1986]
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The same minimal showing may lead to an order of restitution if a court
should "determine that such a remedy is necessary 'to prevent the use or
employment' of the unfair practice."2
The supreme court rejected the Advertisers's claim that the con-
sumer protection causes of action were insufficient in that they failed to
describe the alleged deceptive practices with the requisite particularity.
2 6
The court interpreted its decision in People v. Superior Court 27 as holding
that a plaintiff in a consumer action is not required to plead the exact
language of every deceptive statement; rather, it is sufficient for a plaintiff
"to describe a scheme to mislead customers, and allege that each misrep-
resentation . . . conforms to that scheme."2 The Committee pled just
such a scheme. In addition, the court emphasized that since a demurrer
was in issue, only the legal sufficiency of the pleading was tested.29
Therefore, the Advertisers's contentions regarding whether or not their
words and images were actually misrepresentations "frame[d] an issue
for trial, not demurrer," the court held.3"
Lastly, the court cited policy considerations which prompted the
overruling of the demurrer: requiring the Committee to plead the specif-
ics of each advertisement would be impractical and would have an unde-
sirable deterrent effect."' The court noted that the complaint would need
to include "thousands of pages" of information largely in the Advertis-
ers's possession; the attendant costs, the court reasoned, would "seriously
deter the filing of any such complaint . . . discourag[e] private suits
[and] . . .seriously hamper suits by public officials seeking to enjoin
at 791. See also Hernandez v. Atlantic Finance Co., 105 Cal. App. 3d 65, 164 Cal. Rptr. 279
(1980), where the daughter of the injured party was allowed to bring the action.
25. Committee on Children's Television, 35 Cal. 3d at 211, 673 P.2d at 668-69, 197 Cal.
Rptr. at 792, quoting Fletcher v. Security Pacific National Bank, 23 Cal. 3d 442, 453, 591 P.2d
51, 58, 153 Cal. Rptr. 28, 35 (1979).
26. The Advertisers argued that the complaint should state specific language and persons,
and the specific time, date, and place of the deception.
27. 9 Cal. 3d 283, 507 P.2d 1400, 107 Cal. Rptr. 192 (1973). Jayhill Corporation
("Jayhill") real party in interest. In this case, where defendant encyclopedia salesmen were
charged with false and misleading advertising in violation of § 17500 et. seq., the salesmen
similarly argued that the complaint was insufficient because it did not state the names of the
customers allegedly solicited, the soliciting salesman nor the time and place of the misrepresen-
tation. The court stated that "these evidentiary facts need not be pleaded," and that "M[if
defendants require further specifics in order to prepare their defense, such matters may be the
subject of discovery proceedings." Id. at 288, 507 P.2d at 1403, 107 Cal. Rptr. at 195.
28. Committee on Children's Television, 35 Cal.3d at 212-13, 673 P.2d at 669, 197 Cal.
Rptr. at 792.
29. Id. at 213, 673 P.2d at 670, 197 Cal. Rptr. at 793.
30. Id. at 214, 673 P.2d at 670, 197 Cal. Rptr. at 793.
31. Id. at 214, 673 P.2d at 670-71, 197 Cal. Rptr. at 793-94.
[Vol. 6
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schemes of unfair competition and deceptive advertising."32 Thus, the
supreme court held that the causes of action based on consumer protec-
tion statutes were properly pled.
In contrast, the court found that the causes of action based on fraud
were not sufficiently pled, but that leave to amend should have been
granted.33 In its analysis of these causes of action, the court first noted
certain exceptions to the strict specific pleading requirements normally
associated with a fraud cause of action. The first exception is that less
specificity is required when a defendant " 'must necessarily possess full
information concerning the facts of the controversy.' "" The court rea-
soned that the Advertisers clearly knew the contents of each
advertisement.
Second, the court once again noted that "considerations of practical-
ity enter in."' 35 The court reasoned that the amended sixty-four page
complaint already strained the limits of reasonable length; that is, it
would be less than practical to require the setting out of each advertise-
ment used (over the span of the four year period in question) along with
the corresponding details, when this would consume thousands of
pages.36 The court further reasoned that the "realistic setting" of the
case would make "impossible" the specific pleading of the particular chil-
dren who relied on particular advertisements; it declared that "[p]laintiffs
should be able to base their cause of action upon an allegation that they
acted in response to an advertising campaign even if they cannot recall
the specific advertisements.
'37
However, while the court did hold that the complaint was sufficient
to define the subject of the action and to provide notice to the Advertis-
ers, it also held that the trial court could reasonably require the Com-
mitee to furnish a representative selection of advertisements. The court
opined that this was a sensible compromise between the Advertisers's
right to a sufficiently specific pleading, and the importance of avoiding
prohibitively burdensome pleading requirements in cases involving mul-
tiple misrepresentations.38
32. Id.
33. Id. at 220-21, 673 P.2d at 675, 197 Cal. Rptr. at 798.
34. Id. at 217, 673 P.2d at 672, 197 Cal. Rptr. at 795, quoting Bradley v. Hartford Ace.
and Indem. Co., 30 Cal. App. 3d 818, 106 Cal. Rptr. 718 (1973).
35. Committee on Children's Television, 35 Cal. 3d at 217, 673 P.2d at 672, 197 Cal. Rptr.
at 796.
36. Id. at 217, 673 P.2d at 673, 197 Cal. Rptr. at 796.
37. Id. at 219, 673 P.2d at 674, 197 Cal. Rptr. at 797. This is one area where the court
clearly indicated a desire to stretch the traditional notions of pleading; no authority was cited
for this proposition.
38. Id. at 219, 673 P.2d at 674,197 Cal. Rptr. at 797.
1986]
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Another of the Advertisers's claims rejected by the court was that
the complaint was deficient because it alleged that the children were
deceived, but the parents buy the product. Here the court stated that not
only was the claim inconsistent with the Advertisers's own advertising
strategy but that the applicable law was inconsistent with their argument.
The Restatement Second of Torts Section 533 states that:
"[t]he maker of a fraudulent representation is subject to liabil-
ity .. .to another who acts in justifiable reliance . . . if the
misrepresentation. . . is made to a third person and the maker
intends or has reason to expect that its terms will be repeated or
its substance communicated to the other, and that it will influ-
ence his conduct.",
39
Recognizing that the Committee did not allege that the children actually
repeated the representations, the court reasoned that repetition should
not be a prerequisite to liability, and concluded that "it should be suffi-
cient that the defendant makes a misrepresentation to one group in-
tending to influence the behavior of the ultimate purchaser, and that he
succeeds in this plan."'
But, the court ruled that the complaint was insufficient in the plead-
ing of damages.4" First, the court held that any money spent by the orga-
nizational plaintiffs to counter the influence of the advertising should be
categorized as voluntary expenditures, and not considered to be the re-
sult of any legally cognizable injury to the organization.42 Second, re-
garding the individual plaintiffs the court ruled that a trial court could
properly find the complaint "uncertain" 43 in its failure to plead any spe-
cific health injury to the children or any specific sums spent by the par-
ents to treat those injuries."
Thus, regarding the fraud causes of action, the supreme court up-
held the sustaining of the demurrer, but disapproved of the lower court's
denial of leave to amend. The court, accordingly, modified the judgment
to permit the Committee to cure any uncertainty or lack of specificity
with regard to the individual plaintiffs.
Finally, the lower court's sustaining of the demurrer to the cause of
39. Id. quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 533 (1977).
40. Id. Here again the court did not let a lack of precedent inhibit the finding of the
logical-and desired-result.
41. Damage is an essential element in the pleading of fraud. 5 WITKIN ON PROCFDURE
§ 680 (3d. ed. 1985).
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action based on breach of fiduciary duty was affirmed. Here the court
held that "the various statutory and common law doctrines fashioned to
protect the consumer from overreaching and deception are strong and
flexible enough to accomplish that purpose," such that there is no need
to try to apply the law of fiduciary relationships "to perform a function
for which it was not designed and is largely unsuited."45
The significance of this case extends beyond the realm of procedure.
It is axiomatic that without the sponsors, the show could not go on. In
today's multimedia, capitalistic society, advertising plays an enormous
role. The system runs on money: to earn it, one must sell; to sell, one
must advertise. As a result, advertising has become a multi-billion dollar
industry.46 Not surprisingly, competition for accounts is intense, and
resorting to deception to sell a sponsor's product is unfortunately, but
perhaps inevitably, not uncommon. The public, therefore, needs safe-
guards, or alternatively, a method of fighting back. The California
Supreme Court took the opportunity in Committee on Children's Televi-
sion to preserve the private lawsuit method.
The court realized that if it were to apply strict requirements of
specificity in pleading, "the result would be to eliminate the private law-
suit as a practical remedy to redress such past deception or prevent fur-
ther deception."47 Furthermore, the court was concerned that such a
holding would enable advertisers, "[b]y directing their advertisements to
children and changing them frequently," to obtain "practical immunity
from statutory and common law remedies designed to protect consumers
from misleading advertising. '"" The court recognized the "compelling
interest"49 in protecting the public from being victimized by false and/or
deceptive advertising. 0 So, instead of applying strict pleading require-
ments, the court delineated requirements that were as lenient as practica-
ble; thus, not even an actual showing of deception is necessary.5'
There is, however, a shortcoming in the decision from the stand-
45. Id. at 222, 673 P.2d at 676, 197 Cal. Rptr., at 799.
46. ADVERTISING AGE, May 30, 1983, at 42 col. 4.
47. Committee on Children's Television, 35 Cal. 3d at 222, 673 P.2d at 676, 197 Cal. Rptr.
at 799.
48. Id. at 222-23, 673 P.2d at 676, 197 Cal. Rptr. at 799.
49. For a case dealing with the Constitutional aspects of consumer protection statutes, see
People v. Superior Court, Orange County (Forest E. Olson, Inc. et. al. real parties in interest),
96 Cal. App. 3d 181, 157 Cal. Rptr. 628 (1979).
50. The court has previously referred to the importance of the protection of unwary con-
sumers as "an exigency of the utmost priority in contemporary society." Vasquez v. Superior
Court 4 Cal. 3d 800, 808, 484 P.2d 964, 968, 94 Cal. Rptr. 796, 800 (1971); Fletcher v. Sec.
Pac. Nat'l Bank, 23 Cal. 3d 442, 451, 591 P.2d 51, 56, 153 Cal. Rptr. 28, 33 (1979).
51. This is quite significant considering that deception is the essence of false advertising.
1986]
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point of consumer recovery: the court failed to incorporate Chief Justice
Bird's concurring and dissenting opinion expressing the view that
noncompetitor plaintiffs may recover damges under the consumer pro-
tection statutes.52 While the court suggested that the Committee would
have an adequate remedy without such an addition to the opinion,53 fu-
ture plaintiffs may be unable to state a cause of action in fraud and there-
fore be unable to recover damages.54 The California Court of Appeals
previously allowed noncompetitors to recover damages in United Farm
Workers of America v. Superior Court. 5 But the main obstacle blocking
the supreme court's adoption of that position appears to be its decision in
Chern v. Bank of America,56 decided the year after United Farm
Workers.
In Chern, the court held that damages are not recoverable under the
false advertising law; however, it was silent on the question of whether
damages are recoverable under the unfair competition law. It is signifi-
52. Federal courts have recently eliminated this obstacle to consumer recovery. See Thorn
v. Reliance Van Co., 736 F.2d 929 (3d Cir. 1984).
53. The court explained that "the nonorganizational plaintiffs can recover damages under
their causes of action for fraud, while the organizational plaintiffs have suffered no legally
cognizable damages under any cause of action." Committee on Children's Television, 35 Cal.
3d at 215, 673 P.2d at 671, 197 Cal. Rptr. at 794. However, the court did not say why an
organization "voluntarily" spending money to correct or counter a perceived malefaction
should not be able to recover from a liable perpetrator. Neither did the court explain why such
a monetary loss is not "legally cognizable."
54. Committee on Children's Television, 35 Cal. 3d at 224-25, 673 P.2d at 677-78, 197 Cal.
Rptr. at 801. Fraud requires a showing that the defendant made an untrue assertion of fact
which the defendant knew or should have known to be false. Consumer protection statutes
can be triggered by unintentionally made misleading statements. Although courts have ren-
dered recent decisions which have chipped away at this distinction (e.g. Hauter v. Zogarts, 14
Cal. 3d 104, 534 P.2d 377, 120 Cal. Rptr. 681 (1975)) a distinction still exists.
55. 47 Cal. App. 3d 334, 120 Cal. Rptr. 904 (1975). (Pandol Brothers, Inc. real parties in
interest). This case involved, in relevant part, claims of unfair competition and false represen-
tations to the public, arising out of the defendant corporation's alleged unauthorized use of the
plaintiff's trademark. The court stated:
The fact that the statutes sound in equity and by their terms do not specify that
damages be awarded does not bar the recovery of damages in a proper case even
though the action be one in equity rather than law. This is made clear in [Jayhill].
Id. at 344, 120 Cal. Rptr. at 912.
The court went on to quote Jayhill, in which the supreme court stated: "In the absence of such
a restriction [prohibiting an award of damages] a court of equity may exercise the full range of
its inherent powers in order to accomplish complete justice between the parties.I.." ld. at
344-45, 120 Cal. Rptr. at 911 (quoting Jayhill, 9 Cal. 3d. at 286, 507 P.2d at 1402. 107 Cal.
Rptr. at 194). The court of appeals further stated that Jayhill implied that in a case where an
individual was directly injured, even exemplary damages might be proper. United Farm W'ork-
ers, 47 Cal. App 3d at 345, 120 Cal. Rptr. at 911.
56. 15 Cal 3d 866, 544 P.2d 1310, 127 Cal. Rptr. 110 (1976). Chern involved a class action
suit brought by a bank customer under the false advertising law alleging that the banks method
of computing interest rates and resultant advertising was misleading.
TELEVISION AD VER TISING
cant that the court did not decide the question in Committee on Chil-
dren's Television by merely extending Chern."
Thus, while the Chern precedent may remain undisturbed, perhaps
the court simply has yet to be faced with a case and fact pattern which
clearly dictates its en banc reevaluation. Ultimately, regardless of
whether the supreme court eventually chooses to abandon the Chern pre-
cedent, as suggested by Chief Justice Bird, consumers are in a better posi-
tion to "fight back" in California after Committee on Children's
Television v. General Foods." And even if consumers don't take advan-
tage of the easier access to the court system, the court should be lauded
for its conscientious opinion; if nothing else, it has taken an affirmative




57. Not only did the court not extend Chern, but in a footnote it instructed the reader to
compare United Farm Workers with Chern. Surely if the supreme court were content with the
Chern decision, it would not put it on equal footing, authoritatively, with a court of appeals
decision.
58. In other words, this decision has given the public their first real chance to "fight back"
independently of well known consumer advocate David Horowitz.
59. "Candy breakfasts," that is. For a treatment of Committee on Children's Television
consistent with this casenote, see Kotler, And Now This Commercial Brake, 8 CAL. LAWYER
29 (1985).
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